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STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS 
CURIAE 
 
The interest of amicus curiae Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law 
and Equality
1
 is set forth in the accompanying Motion for Leave to File.  
INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
This Court should interpret Washington’s due process clause to 
afford children in dependency proceedings the right to counsel. The Court 
may reach this conclusion in two distinct ways. First, the Court should 
decide that article I, section 3 affords children such a right, without 
conducting an analysis under State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 
808 (1986). Because Gunwall’s sole purpose is to help courts determine 
whether the state constitution affords greater protection than the federal 
constitution, Gunwall is unnecessary where, as here, there is no federal 
law establishing whether children have a right to counsel in dependency 
proceedings. Furthermore, it is well established that the Washington 
constitution guarantees parents a right to counsel in terminations and 
dependency proceedings. In re the Welfare of Luscier, 84 Wn.2d 135, 137-
38, 524 P.2d 906 (1974); In re the Welfare of Myricks, 85 Wn.2d 252, 
254-55, 533 P.2d 841 (1975). Because a child’s liberty interests at stake in 
                                                 
1
 The Korematsu Center thanks Darrah Hinton, class of 2017 at Seattle 
University School of Law, for her contributions to this brief. 
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a dependency proceeding are at least as great as those of the parents, this 
Court should similarly conclude that article I, section 3 entitles children to 
counsel in this context.  
Second, should this Court decide that a Gunwall analysis is 
necessary, the Court should use the Gunwall analysis as an interpretive 
guide to ensure principled development of state constitutional law. When 
properly contextualized in the myriad other protections afforded to 
children in dependency proceedings by preexisting statutory and common 
law, as well as our Supreme Court’s pronouncements on the right to 
counsel under article I, section 3, providing children in dependencies the 
right to counsel is a meaningful next step in Washington’s deep tradition 
of providing robust protection to children.  
ARGUMENT 
 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD HOLD WITHOUT CONDUCTING 
A GUNWALL ANALYSIS THAT ARTICLE I, SECTION 3 
GUARANTEES CHILDREN IN DEPENDENCY 
PROCEEDINGS THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL.  
 
a. For Matters of First Impression, Washington Courts 
Interpret and Apply the Washington Constitution Before 
the Federal, an Approach that Fosters Robust Development 
of State Constitutional Law. 
 
As our Supreme Court articulated in State v. Coe, Washington 
courts “will first independently interpret and apply the Washington 
constitution in order, among other concerns, to develop a body of 
3 
 
independent jurisprudence, and because consideration of the United States 
Constitution first would be premature.” 101 Wn.2d 364, 374, 679 P.2d 353 
(1984). The different histories and purposes of the state and federal 
constitutions “clearly demonstrate that the protection of the fundamental 
rights of Washington citizens was intended to be and remains a separate 
and important function of our state constitution and courts that is closely 
associated with our sovereignty.” Id. “When a state court neglects its duty 
to evaluate and apply its state constitution, it deprives the people of their 
‘double security.’” Alderwood Assocs. v. Wash. Envtl. Council, 96 Wn.2d 
230, 238, 635 P.2d 108 (1981) (quoting The Federalist No. 51, at 339 
(Modern Library ed. 1937) (A. Hamilton or J. Madison)); see also State v. 
Smith, 117 Wn.2d 263, 283, 814 P.2d 652 (1991) (Utter, J., concurring) 
(observing that “[s]tate constitutions were originally intended to be the 
primary devices to protect individual rights.”).  
This case requires this Court to turn to the state constitution to 
protect individual rights, and in so doing, continue to “develop a body of 
independent jurisprudence.” State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 443, 909 
P.2d 293 (1996). 
b. In Interpreting the Washington Constitution, a Gunwall 
Analysis Is Not Appropriate Where, as Here, There Is No 
Federal Law on Point. 
 
Amicus agrees with appellants that no Gunwall analysis is needed 
4 
 
to determine whether children have a due process right to counsel in 
dependency proceedings under article I, section 3. A Gunwall analysis is a 
comparative tool, designed to guide Washington courts in a principled 
analysis of whether a particular constitutional provision is coextensive 
with its federal counterpart or instead affords heightened protection. 
Because Gunwall’s entire purpose is a comparative tool, as stated 
repeatedly in Gunwall and reinforced by subsequent cases, a Gunwall 
analysis is wholly inappropriate for the matter at hand, where there is no 
federal jurisprudence on point.  
 In Gunwall, the court’s analysis centered on a concern for 
respecting on-point precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court. It began by 
acknowledging that while states have the “sovereign right” to provide 
“more expansive” rights under their state constitutions than under the 
federal, state constitutional decisions that “establish no principled basis for 
repudiating federal precedent” are problematic. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 
59-60 (emphasis added). It spoke of the need for “consistency and 
uniformity between the state and federal governments” by having state 
courts be “sensitive to developments in federal law,” and by looking to 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions as “important guides on the subjects which 
they squarely address.” Id. at 60-61 (citing State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 363, 
450 A.2d 952 (1982) (Handler, J., concurring) (emphasis added)). It 
5 
 
concluded that the six nonexclusive factors would help ensure that the 
Court would not be “merely substituting [its] notion of justice for that of 
duly elected legislative bodies or the United States Supreme Court.” Id. at 
63. It follows that where there is no federal precedent on point, the 
concerns that motivated Gunwall are absent. 
Subsequent decisions reinforced Gunwall’s purpose by focusing on 
whether the Washington constitution provides “greater” or “different” 
protection than under the U.S. Constitution. For instance, in State v. 
Foster, our Supreme Court explicitly recognized that a Gunwall analysis is 
necessary only when there is federal law on point. 135 Wn.2d 441, 455, 
957 P.2d 712 (1998). In conducting its Gunwall analysis of the state’s 
confrontation clause (which had been previously held to be coextensive in 
other confrontation contexts), the court first looked to federal court 
interpretations of the Sixth Amendment because “we must first understand 
the breadth of that right before we can determine whether our state 
confrontation clause provides greater protection to an accused than does 
the federal confrontation clause.” Id. (citing State v. Rainford, 86 Wn. 
App. 431, 436, 936 P.2d 1210 (1997)); see also City of Woodinville v. 
Northshore United Church of Christ, 166 Wn.2d 633, 641, 211 P.3d 406 
(2009) (“[Gunwall] articulates standards to determine when and how 
Washington’s constitution provides different protection of rights than the 
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United States Constitution” (emphasis added)); State v. Martin, 151 Wn. 
App. 98, 105, 210 P.3d 345 (2009) (analysis of federal Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence was necessary to conduct first, in order to “illuminat[e] the 
issues arising in a Gunwall analysis of article I, section 22.”). By 
definition, such a comparative analysis loses its meaning where there is no 
federal precedent “squarely” on point, Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 60, because 
there is nothing against which to compare. In these situations, the Gunwall 
test is inappropriate to use.
2
 
The only question remaining, then, is whether the U.S. Supreme 
Court has addressed children’s right to counsel in dependency 
proceedings, and it clearly has not. It is undeniable that while the U.S. 
Supreme Court has considered parents’ rights in the termination context, 
it has never considered children’s rights to counsel within the dependency 
context. In re Dependency of M.S.R., 174 Wn.2d 1, 15, 271 P.3d 234 
(2012), is instructive on this issue. There, our Supreme Court considered 
whether children had a right to counsel in termination of parental rights 
                                                 
2
 In Andersen v. King Cty., 158 Wn.2d 1, 43, 138 P.3d 963 (2006), the court 
commented in a footnote, “Whether a Gunwall analysis is required does not depend on 
whether there is dispositive federal law.” Id. at 43 n.18. However, the plaintiffs made 
only a single conclusive statement, without support or reasoning, that Gunwall should not 
apply due to the absence of dispositive federal law. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 
18, Andersen v. King Cty., 158 Wn.2d 1 (No. 75934-1) (2004 WL 3155214). City of 
Woodinville, 166 Wn.2d 633, is more recent than Andersen and is more thoroughly 
reasoned, and the comparative methodology set out there and in Foster contradicts the 
position summarily expressed in Andersen without explanation or citation to authority.  
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cases, but confined its analysis to the federal constitution only. However, 
even as to just the federal constitution, the court acknowledged the 
framework laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lassiter v. Department 
of Social Services of Durham County, North Carolina, 452 U.S. 18, 31-32, 
101 S. Ct. 2153, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1981), was only “instructive” and not 
binding, since Lassiter concerned the rights of parents and not children. 
M.S.R., 174 Wn.2d at 15; see also Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 43 n.10 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The possibility of providing counsel for the 
child at the termination proceeding has not been raised by the parties. That 
prospect requires consideration of interests different from those presented 
here, and again might yield a different result with respect to right to 
counsel.”).3 Here, because no federal law exists regarding children’s right 
to counsel in dependency proceedings, a comparison is not only 
unnecessary, it is impossible. 
While there is no federal constitutional precedent on point, 
rendering Gunwall a nullity, this Court can be guided by the 
                                                 
3
 The issue counsel for children in termination proceedings was not before the 
Court in Lassiter, as North Carolina statutorily guarantees state-provided counsel for 
children. 452 U.S. at 28 (citing N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7A–289.29 (Supp.1979)). In the one case 
where the Supreme Court has analyzed the right to counsel for children, it recognized 
such a right. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967) (in 
juvenile delinquency context, reasoning “[t]he juvenile needs…counsel to cope with 
problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the 
proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it.”).   
8 
 
pronouncements of our Supreme Court as to state constitutional precedent 
on similar matters. Article I, section 3 guarantees counsel for parents in 
termination and dependency proceedings, due to the possibility of 
deprivation of physical liberty and of the fundamental right to the parent-
child relationship. Luscier, 84 Wn.2d at 138; Myricks, 85 Wn.2d at 841. 
While these cases preceded Gunwall, the court has suggested several times 
that the cases retain their vitality. See, e.g., King v. King, 162 Wn.2d 378, 
383 n.3, 174 P.3d 659 (2007) (“We note that Luscier and Myricks were 
favorably cited more recently in our case, In re Dependency of Grove.”). 
Both doctrinally and logically, it follows that because parents are 
guaranteed counsel in termination and dependency proceedings, so too 
should children be guaranteed counsel in dependency proceedings, where 
both physical liberty and fundamental liberties are at stake.  
II. ALTERNATIVELY, IF A GUNWALL ANALYSIS IS 
DEEMED NECESSARY NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
ABSENCE OF FEDERAL LAW ON POINT, THIS COURT 
SHOULD USE THE GUNWALL FACTORS AS 
INTERPRETIVE GUIDES TO FURTHER PRINCIPLED 
DEVELOPMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.  
 
a. The Gunwall Analysis Evolved from a Comparative Tool 
to Determine Whether to Apply the State Constitution into 
an Interpretive Guide for How to Apply the State 
Constitution. 
 
State v. Gunwall was responsive to criticism that state courts were 
relying on state constitutional provisions to reach results-oriented 
9 
 
decisions when they simply disagreed with the result dictated by federal 
law. The Gunwall court itself criticized state courts for “resorting to state 
constitutions rather than to analogous provisions of the United States 
Constitution [and] simply announc[ing] that their decision is based on the 
state constitution but…not further explain[ing] it.” 106 Wn.2d at 60.4 In 
other words, Gunwall was initially a response to our state courts’ 
uncertainty “about the propriety of applying their constitutions 
independently of the U.S. Constitution…judges needed comparative 
factors to justify independent analysis.” Robert F. Utter & Hugh D. 
Spitzer, The Washington State Constitution 14 (2d ed. 2013).  
However, while Gunwall initially functioned as a comparative tool 
“for deciding whether to interpret a state provision independently, 
[Gunwall] transformed into factors to guide briefing and to aid the court in 
determining how much weight to accord U.S. Supreme Court decisions.” 
Utter & Spitzer, supra, at 14; see also Hugh Spitzer, New Life for the 
“Criteria Tests” in State Constitutional Jurisprudence: “Gunwall Is 
                                                 
4
 In the watershed case of State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 690-99, 674 P.2d 
1240 (1983), our Supreme Court interpreted article I, section 7 to be more protective than 
the Fourth Amendment. Perfectly summarizing the critique to which the Gunwall court 
responded, the dissent began by criticizing the majority for “picking and choosing 
between state and federal constitutions” to support what was, in the dissent’s view, an 
unprincipled decision. Id. at 703 (Dimmick, J., dissenting).  
10 
 
Dead—Long Live Gunwall!”, 37 Rutgers L.J. 1169, 1178 (2006).5 In fact, 
although the court in Gunwall was transparently addressing the criticism 
that state courts were, “without adequate explanation, relying on state 
constitutions rather than analogous provisions of the U.S. Constitution,” 
Utter & Spitzer, supra, at 14, the formal purpose of the factors as stated in 
Gunwall is “helping to insure that if this court does use independent state 
constitutional grounds in a given situation, it will consider these criteria to 
the end that our decision will be made for well founded legal reasons.” Id. 
(quoting Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 62).  
The key Gunwall cases in the decades following the Gunwall 
decision reflect the evolution in overall function from comparative—
assuming there is federal law on point to compare, which, as discussed 
above, is absent here—to interpretive. In State v. Wethered, 110 Wn.2d 
466, 472, 755 P.2d 797 (1988), while the court declined to reach the state 
constitutional issue on account of inadequate Gunwall briefing, it 
nevertheless articulated that the nonexclusive Gunwall criteria aided in 
                                                 
5
 The Gunwall factors themselves are a mix of comparative factors, which help 
determine whether to apply a state provision differently, and interpretive factors, which 
help determine how to apply a particular provision. Spitzer, supra, at 1178. Factor 1 (text 
of the state constitution), factor 3 (state constitutional history), factor 4 (preexisting state 
law), and factor 6 (matters of particular state and local concern) are interpretive in nature, 
whereas factor 2 (differences in the texts of parallel provisions) and factor 5 (structural 
differences between federal and state constitutions) are explicitly comparative.  
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“developing a sound basis for our state constitutional law,” and 
characterized their “use as interpretive principles of our state 
constitution.”6 Id. In State v. Gocken, 127 Wn.2d 95, 107, 896 P.2d 1267 
(1995), the debate over Gunwall’s function was expressed in stark relief. 
In determining whether the state’s double jeopardy clause provided 
broader protection than the federal, the majority conducted the Gunwall 
analysis to determine whether the state constitution could be invoked, and, 
finding the Washington and federal double jeopardy projections to be 
coextensive, applied the federal test. Id. at 102. In the concurrence/dissent, 
Justice Madsen emphasized that Washington had a “preexisting 
independent analysis of double jeopardy” that should have controlled, and 
that “Gunwall was merely intended to be a tool in the development of a 
principled analysis in cases where an issue is undecided under the state 
constitution.” Id. at 110 (Madsen, J., concurring and dissenting). A few 
years after Gocken, in State v. White, 135 Wn.2d 761, 769, 958 P.2d 982 
(1998), as amended (July 17, 1998), a search case, the court applied article 
I, section 7 without a Gunwall analysis. Thus, the court accepted the view 
                                                 
6
 While Wethered was “repeatedly used as the basis for blocking access to state 
constitutional arguments for lack of adequate Gunwall briefing,” Justice Utter’s intent in 
Wethered was to “steer…[the] court toward using the Gunwall criteria as interpretive 
tools rather than as a magic key to the walled kingdom of the state constitution.” Spitzer, 
supra, at 1180. 
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that Gunwall was meant to establish principles of state constitutional 
jurisprudence: “[o]nce we agree that our prior cases direct the analysis to 
be employed in resolving the legal issue, a Gunwall analysis is no longer 
helpful or necessary.” Id.  
Gunwall’s interpretive function, and its aim of developing 
principled state constitutional jurisprudence, should therefore influence 
how this Court approaches the factors. Gunwall helps “both attorneys and 
judges systematically analyze a challenging question from a variety of 
angles that courts have always used, consciously or unconsciously, to 
evaluate cases.” Spitzer, supra, at 1184.  
b. Gunwall Factors 4 and 6 Encompass Any Preexisting State 
Law that Relates and Gives Context to Washington’s Due 
Process Protections in General, as well as to the Specific 
Nature of the Rights at Stake.  
 
In light of Gunwall’s utility as a means for principled development 
of state constitutional jurisprudence, Amicus urges this Court to analyze 
factors 4 and 6 within an appropriately broad contextual frame. Because 
the purpose of procedural due process is to protect constitutionally 
cognizable rights, a meaningful Gunwall analysis must look not only at the 
constitutional provision itself, but also at the nature of the rights said to be 
protected by due process. Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.S., 171 Wn.2d 695, 710-
11, 257 P.3d 570 (2011) (stating that “context matters” in a due process 
13 
 
analysis, and recognizing the context of that case had to be defined by 
examining the rights implicated in an initial truancy hearing). Thus, factor 
4, which looks at preexisting state law, and factor 6, which asks whether 
the matter is of particular state concern, must take into account both due 
process in general and, more specifically, children’s liberty interests 
implicated in dependency proceedings.
7
 In fact, our Supreme Court 
recognizes that factors 4 and 6 are unique to the context in which the 
interpretation arises. Foster, 135 Wn.2d at 461 (citation omitted).
8
 
Factor 4 includes consideration of the myriad ways in which 
preexisting state law protects children’s liberty interests, in addition to 
preexisting state law analyzing article I, section 3. Factor 6, whether a 
matter is of “particular state or local concern,” also appropriately includes 
an examination of how Washington has moved towards greater protections 
for minors in child welfare cases.  
Our Supreme Court has stated that the right to counsel under the 
state constitution attaches where “the litigant’s physical liberty is 
                                                 
7
 The same would be true for other interpretive factors such as factor 3, which 
looks at state constitutional and common law history. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 58.  
8
 DSHS broadly asserts that “no Washington appellate court applying the 
Gunwall factors has ever concluded that article I, section 3 provides greater protection 
than the Federal Due Process Clause.” Br. of Resp’t at 12. How courts have interpreted 
article I, section 3 in other contexts may or may not be instructive, as it is, by definition, a 
procedural protection that differs according to the nature of right at stake. See, e.g., 
Bellevue Sch. Dist., 171 Wn.2d at 711.  
14 
 
threatened or where a fundamental liberty interest, similar to the parent-
child relationship, is at risk.” In re Grove, 127 Wn.2d 221, 237, 897 P.2d 
1252 (1995) (emphasis added). Consistent with this statement, as 
discussed in Part I.b., supra, our Supreme Court has repeatedly protected 
the right to counsel for parents under article I, section 3 in termination 
proceedings, due to the physical liberty and fundamental liberty interests 
at stake, Luscier, 84 Wn.2d at 138-39, and in dependency proceedings, 
due to fundamental liberty interests at stake, Myricks, 85 Wn.2d at 253-55. 
And our Supreme Court has stated that dependency proceedings implicate 
the child’s physical liberty interests “because the child will be physically 
removed from the parent’s home,” it is the child who “become[s] a ward 
of the State,” and it is the child that faces “the daunting challenge of 
having his or her person put in the custody of the State as a foster child, 
powerless and voiceless, to be forced to move from one foster home to 
another.” M.S.R., 174 Wn.2d at 16.9 “Foster home placement may result in 
multiple changes of homes, schools, and friends over which the child has 
no control.” Id. Given that our Supreme Court has determined parents are 
entitled to counsel in dependency proceedings, where there are 
                                                 
9
 While M.S.R. decided the issue under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 
S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976), and not under article I, section 3, 174 Wn.2d at 15-20, 
the court’s articulation of the children’s interests at stake in termination and dependency 
proceeding is important to consider here.  
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fundamental liberty interests but not physical liberty interests at stake, it 
follows that article I, section 3 should afford counsel to children in 
dependency proceedings, where there are both physical liberty interests 
and fundamental interests at stake. See Appellant’s Br. at 7-13. 
Such a determination would be consistent with Washington’s 
common law that has long championed the welfare of the child in the 
deprivation context. As early as the turn of the 20th century, our Supreme 
Court recognized the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration 
in termination proceedings. Ex Parte Day, 189 Wash. 368, 382, 65 P.2d 
1049 (1937) (“The two principles, then, the welfare of the child and the 
right of the parent, must be considered together, the former being the more 
weighty.” (emphasis added)); see also State v. Rasch, 24 Wash. 332, 335, 
64 P. 531, 533 (1901) (“It is no slight thing to deprive a parent of the care, 
custody, and society of a child, or a child of the protection, guidance, and 
affection of the parent.”).  
Further, our Supreme Court has recognized the importance of 
appointed counsel for children, as counsel provides different and greater 
protection than a guardian ad litem. In In re Parentage of L.B., 155 Wn.2d 
679, 712 n.29, 122 P.3d 161 (2005), amicus argued, like Amicus does 
here, that the child should have appointed counsel. Because none of the 
parties had raised the issue, the court declined to address it. Id. 
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Importantly, however, the court “urge[d] trial courts…to consider the 
interests of children in dependency [and] parentage…proceedings, and 
whether appointing counsel, in addition to and separate from the 
appointment of a GAL, to act on their behalf and represent their interests 
would be … in the interests of justice.” Id. (citing RCW 13.34.100(6); 
RCW 26.09.110; King County LFLR 13) (emphasis added). The court 
noted that when “adjudicating the best interests of the child, we 
must…remain centrally focused on those whose interests with which we 
are concerned, recognizing that not only are they often the most 
vulnerable, but also powerless and voiceless.” Id. (quotations omitted). 
Additionally, the history of state statutory law provides important 
context for this Court’s analysis of factors 4 and 6, as it demonstrates the 
legislature’s recognition of the unique role of counsel.10 In its 2010 
amendments to RCW 13.34.100, 13.34.105, and 13.34.215, the legislature 
added a new section that specifically found that “inconsistent practices in 
and among counties in Washington…resulted in few children being 
notified of their right to request legal counsel.” Laws of 2010, ch. 180, § 1. 
The legislature’s recognition of the importance of providing counsel to 
children in dependencies in fact applies to all dependencies: 
                                                 
10
 Gunwall itself explains that state statutes assist in determining what the proper 
scope of a constitutional right may be. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 61-62.  
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Attorneys…have different skills and obligations than guardians ad 
litem and court-appointed special advocates, especially in forming 
a confidential and privileged relationship with a child….Well-
trained attorneys can provide legal counsel to a child on issues 
such as placement options, visitation rights, educational rights, 
access to services while in care and services available to a child 
upon aging out of care. Well-trained attorneys for a child can: 
(a) Ensure the child’s voice is considered in judicial proceedings; 
(b) Engage the child in his or her legal proceedings; 
(c) Explain to the child his or her legal rights; 
(d) Assist the child, through the attorney's counseling role, to 
consider the consequences of different decisions; and 
(e) Encourage accountability, when appropriate, among the 
different systems that provide services to children. 
 
Id. The 2010 amendments also require that both the state and the guardian 
ad litem notify a child of twelve years old or older of the right to request 
an attorney, and further requires the state and the guardian ad litem to ask 
the child whether he or she wishes an attorney. Laws of 2010, ch. 180, § 2.  
Then, in 2014, the legislature again amended RCW 13.34.100. 
Laws of 2014, ch. 108, § 2. The amendments established a right to counsel 
for dependent children where there is no parent remaining with parental 
rights. Id. The amendments also permit judges to appoint counsel to 
children in any dependency action, either sua sponte or “upon the request 
of a parent, the child, a guardian ad litem, a caregiver, or the department.” 
Id. This increased protectiveness of the right to counsel militates strongly 
in favor of independent interpretation. 
Finally, the treatment in Washington of the right of criminal 
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defendants to confront witnesses provides an illustrative contrast to the 
treatment of the right to counsel, demonstrating both why preexisting law 
supports independent interpretation of the right to counsel under article I, 
section 3, and why the right to counsel is a matter of state concern. In 
State v. Foster, 135 Wn.2d 441, the court observed that over time, 
Washington statutory and case law had carved out more and more 
exceptions to the right for a defendant to confront witnesses, which cut 
against independent analysis under the state constitution. Id. at 463-65 (“In 
recent years, the exceptions to the right have been enlarged….Preexisting 
law does not support an independent analysis of our state confrontation 
clause in the context of the present case.”). Conversely, while federal law 
does not recognize a right to counsel for parents or children, Washington 
law has expanded to recognize a right to counsel for parents both 
statutorily (RCW 13.34.090(2)) and constitutionally (Luscier, 84 Wn.2d 
135; Myricks, 85 Wn.2d 252), and as discussed above, the legislature has 
expanded the reach of RCW 13.34.100 over time.  
In sum, factors 4 and 6 support independent analysis as set forth 
above by Amicus and by S.K-P., Br. of Appellant at 24-28 (factor 4), 28-
29 (factor 6), and factors 2, 3, and 5 support an independent state 
constitution analysis as well, as set forth by S.K-P., Br. of Appellant at 21 
(factor 2), 21-24 (factor 3), 28 (factor 5).  
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c. Pre-Gunwall Decisions Provide Public Policy Rationales 
for Interpreting Article I, Section 3 as Providing Greater 
Protection than Federal Due Process. 
 
The Gunwall court made clear that the six factors are 
“nonexclusive.” 106 Wn.2d at 58. This Court can and therefore should 
consider Washington’s due process jurisprudence prior to Gunwall. In 
State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wn.2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984), and State v. 
Davis, 38 Wn. App. 600, 686 P.2d 1143 (1984), our courts held that article 
I, section 3 mandated greater protection than federal due process.  
In Bartholomew, our Supreme Court held that article I, section 3 
was offended by Washington’s death penalty statute, which permitted the 
jury in the sentencing phase to consider any evidence, even if the evidence 
was inadmissible under the rules of evidence. 101 Wn.2d at 640. The 
Court reasoned that article I, section 3 would not tolerate a statute that 
provided lesser protection to those facing a capital sentence, and that the 
statute was “contrary to the reliability of evidence standard embodied in 
the due process clause of our state constitution.” Id. at 640-41. The Court 
noted that even if its analysis were incorrect under federal law, its 
interpretation of article I, section 3 was not constrained by the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 639. 
In Davis, Division I of this Court held that use of a juvenile 
defendant’s post-arrest silence for impeachment, regardless of whether the 
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silence followed Miranda warnings, was fundamentally unfair and 
violated article I, section 3. 38 Wn. App. at 605. Federal law allowed the 
use of a defendant’s post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes if the 
defendant had not received Miranda warnings. Id. at 604-05 (citing 
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 102 S. Ct. 1309, 71 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1982)). 
The court declined to follow federal law, reasoning that limiting the 
exclusion of post-arrest silence to instances where Miranda warnings are 
given would penalize a defendant who had not been advised of his rights. 
Id. As a matter of public policy, the court was concerned that following 
Fletcher “might also encourage police to delay reading Miranda warnings 
or to dispense with them altogether to preserve the opportunity to use the 
defendant’s silence against him.” Id. at 605.  
Although these cases predate Gunwall, they demonstrate courts 
relying on policy rationales to extend heightened due process protections. 
For a discussion of the compelling policy rationales for children’s right to 
counsel in dependency proceedings, see Br. of Appellant at 42-48 
(describing importance of uniformity and practical courtroom barriers). 
CONCLUSION 
 
 For the reasons set forth in S.K-P.’s briefing and above, the 
Korematsu Center urges this Court to interpret article I, section 3 to 
guarantee counsel for children in dependencies. 
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